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Interest of Amicus 
 Amicus Ernest A. Young is the Alston & Bird Professor at Duke Law 
School.1 He teaches and writes in the fields of Federal Courts and 
Constitutional Law. He has previously filed amicus briefs in support of the 
State of Texas’s standing to challenge the Obama Administration’s 
immigration policy in United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), 
aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). He and a colleague 
have recently completed an article considering the role of public law litigation 
by state attorneys general in the modern federal system. (A copy of that article, 
which will be published in November 2018 and is presently available on 
SSRN, has been submitted to this court with an accompanying motion.) 
Amicus’s purpose is to support the Commonwealth’s claim to standing in this 
case while remaining agnostic as to the merits issues in the case. This brief is 
submitted solely in Professor Young’s individual capacity.  
   
                                           
1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief in letters on file with the 
Clerk of Court.  No counsel for a party has authored this brief in whole or in 
part, and no person other than amicus curiae has made any monetary 
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.   
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Argument 
I. Massachusetts has demonstrated a sufficiently probable concrete 
injury in fact to its proprietary interests. 
 The Commonwealth’s most straightforward basis for standing is that 
“the IFRs . . . will inflict an imminent financial injury on Massachusetts.” 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 18. Under the complex of state and federal rules 
governing insurance coverage for contraceptives, Massachusetts will end up 
having to foot some of the bill if (a) any Massachusetts employers avail 
themselves of the opt-outs created by the IFRs, and (b) some of those 
employers have female employees of childbearing age who are currently 
using affected contraceptive methods. Although the District Court found this 
injury too probabilistic to support standing, the Commonwealth’s injury is 
sufficient under well-established principles. 
A. The Commonwealth’s injury is not “probabilistic.” 
 Probabilistic standing problems arise when, as in Clapper v. Amnesty 
Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013), it is uncertain whether the plaintiff will 
become subject to a challenged government policy.2 In Clapper, the plaintiffs 
                                           
2 Judgments about probability may also come into play when evaluating 
whether a plaintiff’s injury is traceable to the challenged conduct or 
redressable by the requested relief. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
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were attorneys and non-governmental organizations who wished to 
communicate with persons abroad who might become subject to surveillance 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. They lacked standing to 
challenge the FISA because, among other difficulties, they could not establish 
whether the foreign persons they wished to communicate with were actually 
being targeted for surveillance; whether (if those persons were targeted) the 
surveillance would be conducted pursuant to the challenged FISA provision; 
whether (if it were) the FISA court would approve the surveillance; or (if it 
did) whether the surveillance would succeed in capturing their 
communications. Id. at 411-14. These multiple layers of speculation made 
Clapper—to put it mildly—an unusual case. 
 No uncertainty exists, however, that the new IFRs will become 
operative in Massachusetts if not enjoined by the federal courts. Likewise, no 
uncertainty exists concerning Massachusetts’ obligations to treat the IFRs as 
binding federal law. This obligation alone is sufficient to establish several 
concrete injuries in fact. The Commonwealth must alter its own law and 
practices to comply with the IFRs. And its preferred policy of access to 
                                           
757-59 (1984). But the United States has focused its argument in this case on 
the prior question of Massachusetts’ concrete injury in fact. 
4 
 
contraceptives, embodied in the Access Act, will necessarily be constricted, 
particularly with respect to self-insured employer plans covered by ERISA. 
To be sure, federal law would bind the Commonwealth in these areas with or 
without the new IFRs. But this case—especially the Commonwealth’s 
statutory and APA claims—are precisely about the Commonwealth’s right to 
have input into the statutory and administrative processes that shape the 
content of federal law.   
In any event, there is also no probabilistic standing problem with the 
Commonwealth’s financial injury. Neither the United States nor the District 
Court seriously disputes that some Massachusetts employers will seek 
exemptions under the IFRs, that some of their employees will be denied 
contraceptive coverage accordingly, or that in some of these cases the 
Commonwealth will be called upon to fill the gap. Serious disputes may exist 
about the relevant numbers (although Massachusetts relies primarily on the 
Departments’ own estimates, see Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 26-32) but 
standing to sue has never depended upon the magnitude of the plaintiff’s 
injury. See, e.g., Avery v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 312, 316 (D. Mass. 1984) 
(“One of the few settled principles of the law of standing is that the magnitude 
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of a party’s injury is irrelevant.”) (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 
669, 689 n.14 (1972)). 
The District Court hung its hat entirely on Massachusetts’ inability to 
identify specific employers who would seek exemptions, or specific 
employees who would lose coverage and seek funding from the 
Commonwealth. See, e.g., ADD035. Indeed, the District Court went so far as 
to identify particular private plaintiffs that were “profoundly absent” from the 
case, D.Ct. Op. at 30—as if the fact that another plaintiff might have sued in 
itself undermined Massachusetts’ own standing. In any event, the 
Commonwealth is not a membership organization that seeks to establish 
associational standing by way of showing that a particular member would 
have standing based on a specific injury to that member. See, e.g., Hunt v. 
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-44 (1977). 
Rather, Massachusetts asserts standing based on injury to itself. The 
likelihood that Massachusetts employers will seek exemptions under the new 
IFRs and that Massachusetts employees will seek contraceptive coverage 
through the Commonwealth goes to the likelihood or imminence of the 
Commonwealth’s injury. If the fraction of employers eligible to seek 
exemption were very, very low, then one might doubt whether the 
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Commonwealth would incur any injury at all. But the Departments’ own 
estimates foreclose that conclusion. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 26-32. 
And there is no requirement that the Commonwealth identify particular 
persons whose actions under the IFRs are going to bring about its injury. 
 In United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an 
equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), the Fifth Circuit found that 
Texas had standing to challenge the Obama Administration’s Deferred Action 
for Parents of Americans (DAPA) policy, which would have increased the 
total number of aliens considered to be lawfully present in the United States 
by an estimated four million persons. Texas’s standing rested primarily on the 
fact that anyone lawfully present in Texas would be eligible to apply for a 
Texas driver’s license, and that the state incurred costs of approximately $100 
to process each license. See id. at 155. Critically, neither the district court nor 
the Fifth Circuit required Texas to show how many persons made lawfully 
present under DAPA were in Texas, or how many such persons would apply 
for licenses—let alone which particular individuals would do so. See, e.g., id. 
at 162 (noting that standing to challenge the overall program was easier to 
establish than standing to challenge to individual grants of asylum, because 
“it is easier to demonstrate that some DAPA beneficiaries would apply for 
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licenses than it is to establish that a particular alien would”). It was sufficient 
that Texas showed a likelihood that a non-trivial number of persons would 
apply for licenses, causing Texas to incur non-trivial costs attributable to the 
DAPA policy.  
 The United States’ position here relies on the improbable assumption 
that the new IFRs will make no difference, because no one will opt out of the 
contraceptive mandate. That, of course, would make it hard to understand why 
the Administration undertook such a major revision of the rules. 
B. The U.S.’s “self-inflicted” injury argument lacks any 
merit. 
 In the District Court, the United States suggested that Massachusetts 
injury was “self-inflicted” because it arises from the Commonwealth’s policy 
choice to provide reimbursement where federal law does not. See 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion to Dismiss at 12-13. 
But there is simply no such thing as a “self-inflicted injury” rule of the sort 
that the United States invokes. 
The United States’ argument rests entirely on Pennsylvania v. New 
Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (per curiam). That case considered two separate 
motions for leave to file complaints in the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction concerning taxation by one state that allegedly injured other 
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states. The Court said—entirely without explanation—that “[n]o State can be 
heard to complain about damage inflicted by its own hand.” Id. at 664. But 
the Court did not describe this as a rule of “standing.”3 Pennsylvania’s 
discussion is best read as not concerning Article III standing at all, but rather 
as an application of the Supreme Court’s standard for exercising its original 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 76 (1992) 
(“Recognizing the delicate and grave character of our original jurisdiction, we 
have interpreted the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) as making our 
original jurisdiction obligatory only in appropriate cases, and as providing us 
with substantial discretion to make case-by-case judgments as to the practical 
necessity of an original forum in this Court.”) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). One criterion for the exercise of jurisdiction is that “it must 
appear that the complaining State has suffered a wrong through the action of 
the other State,” Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15 (1939), and it is 
evidently this requirement that concerned the Court in Pennsylvania. The 
                                           
3 The only use of the term “standing” in the opinion occurs in the Court’s later 
discussion of Pennsylvania’s additional parens patriae claim on behalf of its 
citizens. See 426 U.S. at 665. The Court rejected that claim based on other 
grounds having nothing to do with self-inflicted injury. 
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original jurisdiction cases do not invoke Article III and there is no reason to 
believe that the standards are the same.4 
In any event, the novel requirement proposed by the United States would 
have radical implications for standing doctrine. Most injuries can be avoided 
by some action or other. Certainly the justiciability rules do not categorically 
require the States to take evasive action at all costs to avoid injury at the hands 
of federal law. When a state law has been held invalid on federal constitutional 
grounds, for example, the state has standing to appeal that judgment based on 
the injury that inheres in not being able to enforce its law;5 no one says that 
this injury is “self-inflicted” because the state did not have to enact its law in 
the first place. Massachusetts was not required here to alter its legal regime to 
accommodate a change in federal law that injured it, without first having the 
opportunity to challenge the validity of that federal change. See, e.g., Alfred 
                                           
4 See also Richard D. Freer & Edward H. Cooper, 13B Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 3531.11.1 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated April 2015) (“The 
special concerns that have guided the Court in this area [original jurisdiction] 
are unique to its own jurisdictional problems, and do not provide a sure basis 
for analogous reasoning in other areas of state standing.”). 
5 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (permitting a state 
government intervenor to appeal a judgment invalidating a state law because 
“a State clearly has a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its 
own statutes”). 
10 
 
L. Snapp & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982) 
(recognizing a State’s “sovereign interest” in “the power to create and enforce 
a legal code”). 
C. The Massachusetts Access Act demonstrates, rather 
than undermines, the Commonwealth’s standing in 
this case. 
 The Departments’ own estimates confirm that many employers will 
seek exemptions under the IFRs, and that many women will be forced to look 
elsewhere for contraceptive coverage. The only reason given by the District 
Court for rejecting the Commonwealth’s argument that it would be 
proportionately affected was the passage of Massachusetts’ ACCESS Act 
which “requires essentially the same coverage as the ACA mandate.” 
ADD025. That Court concluded that “[i]t is clear that, given the new ACCESS 
Act, Massachusetts will be affected differently by the IFRs than other states 
but it is not at all clear how the coverage of the Access Act will impact 
employers who may have intended to utilize the expanded exemptions.” 
ADD027. That much is no doubt true. But the District Court erred when it 
leaped from the observation that “the ACCESS Act affects the ‘metes and 
bounds’ of the Commonwealth’s injury”—which the Court conceded was 
“irrelevant”—to a decision to discount “the likelihood that the 
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Commonwealth will be injured” at all. Id. After all, the magnitude of the 
plaintiff’s injury is irrelevant to standing. And no one claimed below that the 
ACCESS Act would eliminate the IFRs’ impact altogether. 
 Even if the Access Act did ensure that every employer who seeks an 
exemption under the IFRs would nonetheless be bound to provide 
contraceptive coverage under the ACCESS Act, the IFRs would nonetheless 
have transformed the legal regime in ways that injure the Commonwealth. 
Specifically, the IFRs would still have shifted responsibility for enforcement 
of the contraceptive mandate from federal to state authorities. The costs of 
enforcing that state mandate, in terms of budgetary outlays, diversion of 
enforcement officials from other priorities, and even political backlash, would 
count as injury attributable to the federal IFRs.6 
 This point simply underscores that a state does not undermine its own 
standing to challenge a federal law by passing a state law seeking to mitigate 
                                           
6 Nor does the temporal sequence matter. To the extent that the 
Commonwealth suggests that Massachusetts employers were already subject 
to a contraceptive mandate prior to the ACA under the 2002 Contraceptive 
Equity Law, Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 43, the ACA and its accompanying 
rules would have eased that enforcement burden. The re-allocation of 
enforcement costs to the Commonwealth as a result of the new IFRs would 
still constitute an injury.  
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its injury. Massachusetts has made a judgment that its ultimate costs will be 
lessened by deploying its own resources to enforce broader access to 
contraceptives than by leaving a broad class of employers without coverage 
obligations. But if an unlawful change in federal policy has made this step 
necessary, that imposed necessity is itself an injury supporting standing.7 
D. Arguments about the speculative nature of the 
Commonwealth’s injury raise questions of ripeness, 
not standing. 
 To the extent that Massachusetts’ injuries are thought to be prospective 
and uncertain, that concern goes to the timing of judicial review rather than to 
its appropriateness. Any uncertainties, in other words, arise from the fact that 
Massachusetts seeks pre-enforcement review of the IFRs. The availability of 
such review is governed by the ripeness framework established in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). That framework assesses “the 
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of 
withholding court consideration.” Id. at 149. Under that framework, judicial 
review is plainly appropriate here. 
                                           
7 Neither party has argued that the IFRs preempt the Access Act or similar 
statutes. If they did, then the Commonwealth would plainly have standing to 
challenge them. 
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 As in Abbott Laboratories, the Commonwealth challenges 
administrative action as not only procedurally flawed but inconsistent with the 
underlying statutory mandate. This is a “purely legal” question that can be 
resolved by recourse to the underlying statute and precedents about the scope 
of executive enforcement discretion; it does not turn on factual suppositions 
about events yet to occur. And the hardship of denying pre-enforcement 
review arises from the difficulty and potential unfairness and complexity 
involved in unwinding grants of exemptions once they have been made 
pursuant to the challenged IFRs. This case is ripe for review, and the United 
States cannot evade that conclusion by repackaging its argument as one of 
standing. 
II. Massachusetts has parens patriae standing. 
 A State has an acknowledged “set of interests . . . in the well being of 
its populace.” Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602. Snapp recognized two kinds of “quasi-
sovereign” interests sufficient to support Article III standing: “First, a State 
has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being-both physical and 
economic-of its residents in general. Second, a State has a quasi-sovereign 
interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the 
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federal system.” Id. at 607. Massachusetts has both sorts of interests at stake 
in this case.  
A. This case implicates Massachusetts’ quasi-sovereign 
interest in its citizens’ welfare. 
 The Commonwealth’s most obvious quasi-sovereign interest is simply 
the harm to Massachusetts citizens who will lose contraceptive coverage 
under the new IFRs. The District Court misunderstood this interest by treating 
it as identical to Massachusetts’ proprietary interests in avoiding becoming 
responsible for contraceptive coverage in the absence of federal coverage. 
When asserting its quasi-sovereign interest in its citizens’ well-being, 
Massachusetts need not show that any costs will be passed through to the 
Commonwealth; for the same reason, there is no ground to argue that the harm 
to Massachusetts citizens, as opposed to the Commonwealth itself, is “self-
inflicted.”  
Moreover, Snapp makes clear that the substantiality of a state’s interest 
is measured not quantitatively but rather from the standpoint of the state’s own 
policy priorities. Hence, “[o]ne helpful indication in determining whether an 
alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State 
standing to sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if 
it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking 
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powers.” 458 U.S. at 607. The Commonwealth has addressed the issue of 
contraceptive coverage in employer health plans through its Contraceptive 
Equity Law in 2002 and in the more recent ACCESS Act. See Massachusetts 
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519-20 (2007) (holding that Massachusetts’ quasi-
sovereign interests were implicated where federal law partially preempted the 
Commonwealth’s ability to protect its citizens directly). These examples of 
Massachusetts’ concern with contraceptive access meet the central purpose of 
Snapp’s test, which is to confine quasi-sovereign interests to areas of state 
legislative policy interest—as opposed to cases in which the state is a 
“nominal party.” 458 U.S. at 607 (“[T]he State must articulate an interest apart 
from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than 
a nominal party.”). The quantitative standard applied by the District Court, by 
contrast, invites federal courts to sit in judgment of state policy priorities. 
The District Court held that “Plaintiff’s quasi-sovereign interest theory 
of standing is wanting for the same reason as its financial harm theory”—that 
is, the failure to “identify any particular woman who is likely to lose 
contraceptive coverage” or “any Massachusetts employer” likely to seek an 
exemption. ADD039. This was error. In effect, the District Court treated the 
Commonwealth as if it were a membership organization asserting 
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associational standing. A membership association, like the Sierra Club, would 
be obliged to identify at least one particular member who would have 
standing, and thus to show a concrete injury in fact to a particular person. See 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-40 (1972). But states have a quite 
different obligation. The parens patriae doctrine requires them “articulate an 
interest apart from the interests of particular private parties.” See Snapp, 458 
U.S. at 607 (emphasis added). No authority holds that states must both 
articulate their own quasi-sovereign interest and identify particular citizens 
who are harmed. See, e.g., id. (“[A] State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the 
health and well-being-both physical and economic-of its residents in 
general.”). Given Massachusetts v. EPA’s statement that states are entitled to 
“special solicitude” in the standing analysis, 549 U.S. at 520, the District 
Court was wrong to set the standing bar higher for state governments than for 
private associations.  
B. Massachusetts also has a quasi-sovereign interest in its 
equal participation in the federal system 
Snapp recognized a quasi-sovereign interest in “a quasi-sovereign 
interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the 
federal system.” 458 U.S. at 607. This is not simply an interest in being 
denied, say, sovereign rights protected by the “equal footing” doctrine. 
17 
 
Rather, it includes “securing observance of the terms under which [the state] 
participates in the federal system.” Id. at 607-08. Ever since the New Deal, 
those terms have been cooperative—that is, the old “dual federalism” regime 
of separate state and federal spheres has been replaced by cooperative 
federalism structures in which state governments pervasively participate in 
the implementation of federal law.8 Even where states play no direct 
enforcement role, the operation of state law is typically structured around, and 
crucially affected by, the operation of federal legal regimes.9 Because states 
no longer enjoy significant zones of exclusive regulatory authority, and 
because they are intimately involved in the federal regulatory process, some 
of the most important “terms under which the state participates in the federal 
                                           
8 See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for 
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 663, 665 (2001); Morton Grodzins, 
The American Federal System, in A Nation of States: Essays on the American 
Federal System 1-2 (Robert A. Goldwin, ed., 1961). 
9 Cf. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 163 (holding that Texas fell within 
the zone of interests of the Immigration & Naturalization Act because 
“Texas seeks to participate in notice and comment before the Secretary 
changes the immigration classification of millions of illegal aliens in a way 
that forces the state to the Hobson's choice of spending millions of dollars to 
subsidize driver's licenses or changing its statutes.”). 
18 
 
system” involve the states’ opportunities to participate in debates about 
federal policy. 
Most obviously, states participate in federal policy debates through 
their congressional representatives.10 The trouble is that, as Justice White 
observed 35 year ago, “[f]or some time, the sheer amount of law . . . made by 
the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by Congress 
through the traditional process.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985-86 (1983) 
(White, J., dissenting). That law, however, is legitimate only to the extent that 
it can be tied back to some decision by Congress.11 This is so not only because 
the agencies lack any constitutionally-conferred lawmaking power of their 
own, but—more importantly from the states’ perspective—congressional 
deliberation remains the primary arena in which they are represented. Hence, 
it is critical that states remain able to assert precisely the sort of statutory claim 
that Massachusetts asserts here: that the agency has exceeded the scope of its 
                                           
10 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-
54 (1985); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The 
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954). 
11 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net 
Down: Administrative Federalism without Congress, 57 Duke L.J. 2111, 
2130-41 (2008). 
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mandate under the law that Congress wrote.12 Without this safeguard, states 
would be critically “excluded from the benefits that are to flow from 
participation in the federal system.” Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608. 
Substantive review under the Administrative Procedure Act, however, 
is an incomplete protection for states in contemporary American 
policymaking. Given the broad terms of modern federal statutes, the most 
important “legislative” battles involve the sorts of rulemaking proceedings at 
issue here. In that setting, the APA’s notice and comment requirement—as 
well as the opportunity to sue when that right is denied—affords state 
governments their own independent voice in federal policymaking analogous 
to their constitutionally-mandated representation in national legislation. As 
Daniel Francis has observed, this “independence of voice may be particularly 
useful when the levels of government exhibit significant interdependence of 
action. In modern America, state institutions and officials are deeply 
enmeshed in federal programs: state officials administer federal programs, 
enforce federal law, and interpret federal norms, formally subject in all cases 
                                           
12 See generally Comment, State Standing to Challenge Federal 
Administrative Action: A Re-Examination of the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 125 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1069, 1094-1103 (1977). 
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to federal decision-makers.”13 Given the cooperative structure of most federal 
regulatory programs, it would be difficult to identify any class of entities more 
pervasively enmeshed in and affected by changes in federal regulations than 
state governments. States must have a voice in that process before rules 
become finalized. 
C. Massachusetts v. Mellon does not bar the 
Commonwealth’s suit. 
Below, the United States argued for a categorical rule that “a State 
cannot sue the federal government ‘to protect citizens of the United States 
from the operation’ of federal law.” Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ 
Cross-Motion to Dismiss at 13 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 
447, 485 (1923)). The District Court wisely did not rely on this construction 
of Mellon. That decision does not apply to this case by its own terms, and the 
Supreme Court narrowed it considerably in Massachusetts v. EPA.  
                                           
13 Daniel Francis, Litigation as a Political Safeguard of Federalism, 49 Ariz. 
St. L. J. 1023, 1050 (2017). Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and 
Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health 
Reform and Beyond, 121 Yale L.J. 534, 536 (2011) (“[E]very branch of state 
government is squarely in the midst of creating, implementing, and 
interpreting federal statutory law.”). 
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First, Mellon involved parens patriae suits based on the welfare of a 
state’s citizens. See id. at 485-86. In such situations, the United States can 
plausibly claim that it likewise has a parens patriae interest; American 
citizens, after all, are citizens of both the state and the nation. But as discussed 
in Section B, supra, this case also implicates the Commonwealth’s interest in 
equal participation in the federal system. The United States has never claimed 
the exclusive right to vindicate that interest, and Mellon did not discuss it.   
Second, the Massachusetts v. EPA Court read Mellon far more narrowly 
than does the United States. Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Massachusetts 
v. EPA cited Mellon for the proposition that “our cases cast significant doubt 
on a State’s standing to assert a quasi-sovereign interest . . . against the Federal 
Government.” 549 U.S. at 539 (Roberts, CJ, dissenting) (citing Mellon, 262 
U.S. at 485-86). “Not so,” responded Justice Stevens for the majority: 
Mellon itself disavowed any such broad reading when it noted 
that the Court had been “called upon to adjudicate, not rights of 
person or property, not rights of dominion over physical domain, 
[and] not quasi-sovereign rights actually invaded or threatened.” 
262 U.S., at 484–485  (emphasis added). In any event, we held 
in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945), 
that there is a critical difference between allowing a State “to 
protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes” (which 
is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a State to assert its rights 
under federal law (which it has standing to do). 549 U.S. at 520 
n. 17. 
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As in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Commonwealth “does not here dispute that 
[the ACA or the APA] applies to its citizens; it rather seeks to assert its rights 
under the Act[s].” Id. Specifically, Massachusetts argues that the new IFRs 
injure its citizens by denying them coverage guaranteed by the ACA, and that 
implementing those IFRs without notice and comment denies the 
Commonwealth’s right to participate in federal rulemaking under the APA. 
Hence both Massachusetts’ quasi-sovereign interests—its interest in 
participating in the federal system and its interest in protecting its citizens’ 
welfare—provide valid and independent bases for parens patriae standing 
here. To the extent that the Government reads Mellon for a more restrictive 
rule, that reading did not survive Massachusetts v. EPA. 
The Court’s construction of parens patriae standing in Massachusetts 
v. EPA confers broad standing on states to vindicate rights under federal law. 
That reading is far more consistent with the design of our federal system than 
the Government’s over-reading of Mellon. Two bedrock elements of that 
system are relevant here: the dual capacity of American citizenship and the 
basic integration of state and federal law. As Justice Kennedy pointed out in 
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, “[t]he Framers split the atom of 
sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two 
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political capacities, one state and one federal. . . .” 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Alexander Hamilton explained how these 
capacities facilitate individual liberty in Federalist 28: 
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general 
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations 
of the state governments, and these will have the same 
disposition towards the general government. The people, by 
throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it 
preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make 
use of the other as the instrument of redress. Federalist No. 28, 
at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (italics 
added). 
To say that only the national government may protect citizens from violations 
of national law, as the United States suggests, would turn this dynamic on its 
head. 
 The integration of federal and state law confirms this conclusion. In 
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), for example, the Court rejected the notion 
that Rhode Island courts could refuse to hear a federal claim because the 
federal statute was contrary to state public policy. Quoting an earlier case 
arising in Connecticut, the Court insisted that  
When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by 
the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and 
all the states, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy 
is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated 
from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in 
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the courts of the state. 330 U.S. at 392 (quoting Mondou v.New 
York, N.H. &H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912)).  
Testa illustrates that “‘[t]he laws of the United States are laws in the several 
States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State 
laws are.... The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which 
constitutes the law of the land for the State.’” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 
469-70 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Claflin v. 
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876)). That means, on the one hand, that 
the state courts must be open to federal claims. But it also means that rights 
under federal law are not somehow alien or beyond the states’ purview. 
Rather, as Massachusetts v. EPA confirmed, they are appropriately enforced 
by state governments when violations of federal law implicate a state’s quasi-
sovereign interests. 
III. Massachusetts has standing to raise its Religious Establishment 
and Equal Protection claims. 
 The District Court did not separately address the Commonwealth’s 
standing to pursue claims that the IFRs violate the Establishment Clause or 
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. But the United States has, albeit in passing, challenged 
Massachusetts’ standing to raise any claim under those provisions. See 
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Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion to Dismiss at 10 n. 5. 
These provisions do raise distinct issues that deserve separate attention. But if 
anything, the Commonwealth’s constitutional claims offer an even more 
direct path to standing than its statutory ones do. 
  Massachusetts has alleged that the IFRs violate the Establishment 
Clause because they give a preferred position to religious belief, and that they 
deny equal protection of the laws by imposing burdens uniquely on women. 
See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 33-40. 
Both these claims implicate the Commonwealth’s quasi-sovereign interest in 
the welfare of its citizens, and hence they are appropriate instances of parens 
patriae standing.14 Nothing turns, as the Government suggested below, on 
whether a state is the sort of entity that can experience “spiritual” harm. 
                                           
14 These claims do come closer to the circumstances of Massachusetts v. 
Mellon than do the Commonwealth’s statutory claims. Mellon rejected a 
Tenth Amendment challenge to a federal appropriations measure creating a 
conditional spending regime meant to encourage states to protect maternal 
health. See 262 U.S. at 479. The result was over-determined: the Court 
suggested variously, without much explanation, that the challenge was invalid 
on the merits because the law involved the offer of a benefit rather than the 
imposition of an obligation, see id. at 480, 482, that it was a nonjusticiable 
political question, see id. at 481, 483-85, and that Massachusetts lacked 
standing to sue parens patriae. But Massachusetts v. EPA denied any broad 
reading of Mellon’s principle. See supra Section II.C. Moreover, Mellon 
declined “to say that a state may never intervene by suit to protect its citizens 
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 Importantly, neither the establishment nor the equal protection claim 
depends on whether any Massachusetts employers avail themselves of their 
option under the new IFRs. The Commonwealth claims that the IFRs 
“endorse” religion simply by creating this broad option and making it 
available only to religious objectors. See id. at 35. That violation—and 
whatever injury a reasonable observer would feel as a result—occurs as soon 
as the policy goes into effect.  
Likewise, the Commonwealth’s equal protection theory is that the legal 
regime created by the IFRs, which fails to guarantee contraceptive access to 
women, inherently fails to provide the “equal protection of the laws.” If a 
state’s law forbidding assault criminalized only attacks on men, that law 
would be recognized as a denial of equal protection whether or not any woman 
were actually assaulted. Here too, the constitutional violation as framed in 
Massachusetts’ lawsuit is complete when the IFRs go into effect. See id. at 38. 
                                           
against any form of enforcement of unconstitutional acts of Congress,” 262 
U.S. at 485, and the effort in Mellon to assert citizens’ welfare under the Tenth 
Amendment raises quite different questions than a state’s parens patriae 
enforcement of individual rights provisions like the First and Fifth 
Amendments. In any event, Mellon’s suggestion that the national government 
is the judge of its own constitutional power is inconsistent with much 
contemporary jurisprudence and should not be read expansively. 
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Amici take no position on whether either of these constitutional theories is 
valid on the merits; for jurisdictional purposes, however, the question is 
whether the plaintiff has standing to raise the claim that it has pled. 
IV. States have a legitimate role to play in challenging unlawful federal 
policies because they provide an effective mechanism for 
vindicating diffuse interests. 
Massachusetts v. EPA’s “special solicitude” for States’ standing makes 
sound functional sense, because States will often be uniquely appropriate 
litigants for bringing certain sorts of claims. One of the most difficult 
problems in federal practice and procedure concerns the appropriate 
mechanisms for aggregating claims that affect large numbers of people but 
that individual litigants lack the incentives or the wherewithal to pursue.15 Our 
law has adopted a number of solutions—such as class actions or 
organizational standing—as means of aggregating claims that are 
impracticable to bring on an individual basis. But these mechanisms all have 
their problems, and none addresses the lack of individual standing when 
injuries occur to diffuse public interests. States, however, are empowered by 
                                           
15 See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public Law 
Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 97 Tex. L. Rev. __ [draft at 50-56] 
(forthcoming Nov. 2018). 
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state constitutions and the Tenth Amendment to represent the diffuse public 
interest of their citizens. 
 One significant advantage that States have over private organizations 
and class actions is that they have built-in mechanisms of democratic 
accountability for their conduct of litigation on behalf of their citizens.16 
Justices of the Supreme Court have complained that the use of “private 
attorneys general” to enforce federal law raises significant problems of public 
accountability, and similar concerns have been raised about the accountability 
of class counsel in class actions.17 State officials who sue on behalf of their 
citizens are politically accountable for their actions, however. A recent re-
election campaign by the Texas Attorney General, for example, featured 
                                           
16 See, e.g., Lemos & Young, supra, at 56-60; Bradford Mank, Should States 
Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. 
EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1701, 1784 
(2008) (discussing checks on state litigation). 
17 See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 36 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing private attorneys general); In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting concern about lack 
of accountability of class counsel). 
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public debate about the appropriateness of the State’s participation in 
litigation challenging the Affordable Care Act.18  
More generally, litigation by States fits well into a constitutional system 
predicated on the notion that no one person or institution can lay a unique 
claim to the public interest. Our system of both vertical and horizontal checks 
and balances recognizes that the public benefits when multiple institutions can 
step in if a particular officer or agency fails to pursue the public welfare or 
respect legal constraints. Even in an area of strong national interest like 
climate change, immigration, or healthcare, the national Executive is not, and 
cannot be, judge in its own case. By according “special solicitude” to States’ 
standing, Massachusetts v. EPA facilitated States’ valuable role in the process 
by which every political institution is held accountable to the rule of law. 
Conclusion 
 The decision of the District Court that Massachusetts lacks standing to 
pursue its claims in this case should be reversed. 
                                           
18 See Chuck Lindell, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott Opposes Federal 
Government on Many Fronts, Austin American-Statesman, Aug. 7, 2010, 
available at http://www.statesman.com/news/texaspolitics/texas-attorney-
general-greg-abbott-opposes-federal-government-
847623.html?printArticle=y. 
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